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Abstract
In this paper we investigate some implications of recent results about salience on
loan decisions. Using the framework of focus-weighted utility we show that consumers
might take out loans even when that yield them negative utility. We claim however,
that consumers are more prudent in their decisions and might be less likely to take out
such loans when the usual fixed- and increasing-installment plans are coupled with a
decreasing-installment option. We argue that harmful loan consumption, especially in
the case of loans with increasing-installments (e.g. alternative mortgage loans), could
be decreased if a policy would prescribe presentation of loan repayment schedules in a
way that employs this effect. Moreover, using the model of focus-weighted utility we
give a possible explanation for the unpopularity of decreasing-installment plans, the
success of increasing-installment plans and their higher default rate during the financial
crisis.
Keywords: focus weighted utility, loan decisions, welfare analysis
1 Introduction
Suppose you are about to purchase a laptop, worth a $1000. A shop offers a loan plan
which lets you to repay its price in two equal installments of $500 each. An other shop
would offer you the same loan plan with a choice of either two equal-size repayments of
$500 each (same as the first shop’s offer), or two decreasing installments of $750 and $250,
respectively. Given you would have purchased the laptop at the first shop, would it mean
that you would also purchase it at the second shop if you happened to see their offer first?
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Based on the classical discounted utility model, rational decision-makers would consider
the second shop’s offer at least as good as the first’s one. That is, if one would choose to
purchase the item based on the first shop’s offer, she would definitely purchase it when she
is facing the options offered by the second shop.
However, a growing body of evidence from laboratory and field experiments suggests
that this might not necessarily be the case. Provocative examples are presented for example
in Schkade and Kahneman (1998) or in Dunn et al. (2003). In these articles the authors find
strong support for the observation that decision-makers tend to overweight few attributes
of a decision relative to the others leading to counterintuitive results.1
The concept of disproportionate weighting of attributes has been recently formalized for
both risky decisions (Bordalo et al., 2012a) and intertemporal choices (Kőszegi and Szeidl,
2013).2 The intuition behind these approaches is that people tend to assign greater weight
to the importance of an attribute in which their alternatives differ more. These models
are successful in explaining several puzzles in different fields of economic decisions. More
specifically, the model of Bordalo and his collegues can account for decoy effect (Bordalo
et al., 2013a), probability weighting (Bordalo et al., 2012a), stereotypes (Bordalo et al.,
2014), endowment effects (Bordalo et al., 2012b) and asset prices (Bordalo et al., 2013b).
Furthermore, the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) explains time-inconsistent behavior,
both present bias and overcommitment to future goals at the same time, price sensitivity
in health decisions (Abaluck, 2011), loan financing without budget constraints (Bertaut et
al., 2009; Stango and Zinman, 2009) and lump-sum preferences compared to annuity in
retirement and health decisions (Brown et al., 2008).
While the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) shows obvious similarities to the one
presented in Bordalo et al. (2012a,b, 2013a,b, 2014) it assumes a weight function which is
not option-specific in contrast to the option-specific characterisation suggested by Bordalo
and his colleagues and thus is more suitable to draw welfare conclusions and regulatory im-
plications. The framework builds on a time-separable utility function where each attribute
measures the consumption in a given time period and welfare is the sum of the utilities of
the respective consumption. The decision-maker maximizes her focus-weighted utility in
which the utility of a time period is weighted by a focus function. However, this framework
doesn’t specify the focus function in the presence of discounting. In this paper we apply
this framework and present a model about loan decisions. To make the framework suitable
for analysing intertemporal decisions we introduce discounting and consider a more general
case of the model of focusing. We analyze two different specifications of the focus function:
1More related examples can be found in Huber et al. (1982), Simonson (1989), Tversky and Simonson
(1993) or Roelofsma and Read (2000). For a detailed review of related experimental findings see for
example Camerer et al. (2004). More recently, Bertrand et al. (2010) presented field experiment evidence
about how context specific information changes the decision-maker’s behaviour.
2For earlier works on this literature see Tversky (1969), Tversky and Simonson (1993), González-Vallejo
et al. (1996), Roelofsma and Read (2000), González-Vallejo (2002), Scholten and Read (2010) or
González-Vallejo et al. (2012).
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decision-makers either focus on the nominal values of the utility or on the discounted values
of the utility. We show that a decision-maker’s disproportionate focus on the initial benefit
a loan entails (e.g. when receiving money or a purchased good) can lead to decisions which
yield negative utility.3 However, as we will show in this paper this can be counterbalanced
by introducing a specific alternative repayment schedule. In particular, we claim that the
introduction of a decreasing-installments plan in addition to a fixed-installments plan makes
the decision-maker less likely to take out loans which would yield her negative utility. That
is, adding well designed new alternatives to the choice-set decreases the bias towards taking
out loans and as a consequence increases welfare. This might have important implications
for policy making regarding loan consumption. We also find that even tough decreasing
repayment plans have a positive effect on loan decisions they are always dominated by
fixed-installment plans. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Cox et al.
(2014) that decreasing repayment plans (e.g., equal principal repayment plan) are not pop-
ular in the loan market. Furthermore, we show that in some specific cases the introduction
of an increasing-installments plan can further increase the focusing bias. This may explain
why alternative mortgages had gained a large market share both in the US and Europe
(Demyanyk and Hemert, 2011; Cox et al., 2014). Based on this result one may claim that
the high focusing bias generated by the increasing-installments plans may account for the
higher default rate among alternative mortgages.4
In what follows we present our model, derive its propositions and finally interpret our
results.
2 The Model
Let the intertemporal consumption choice set be given by CT+1, where T > 1. Adapting the
framework of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) we assume that the consumer maximizes her focus-
weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 gtut(ct), where gt ≡ g(maxc ut(ct) −minc ut(ct)) is
a focus weight on period (attribute) t with g(·) as a positive, strictly increasing function.
However, by consuming c = (c0, c1, . . . cT ) ∈ CT+1 she realizes a consumption utility of
U(c) =
∑T
t=0 ut(ct).
In order to make the model more specific and relevant to intertemporal choices, we in-
troduce discounting and consider focus-weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 δ(t)gtut(ct),
with δ(t) ≡ δt as the discount function, where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the per period discount factor.
Furthermore, we consider personal welfare as U(c) =
∑T
t=1 δ
tut(ct). It is important to note
3This result is in line with the empirical observation that people tend to underestimate the burden of a
loan (Hoelzl et al., 2009; Akers, 2014).
4Mayer et al. (2009) findings suggest that the sharp increase of mortgage loans with initial fixed interest
rates followed by a period of adjustable-rates, could be one of the main causes for the rise in mortgage
defaults in the late 2000s. As the authors show, a vast majority of these loans had become seriously
delinquent, especially after the initial fixed rate period had ended, and many cases eventually resulted in
default. Similar results are presented by Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) and Amromin et al. (2011).
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that with this specification of the focus weights, the decision-maker’s focus is based on the
nominal values instead of the discounted values. In section 3 we will show the consequences
of the model when the focus weight is based on the discounted values.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 ut(ct) = ct, i.e., the utility function is a money metric measure.
Assumption 2 The loan free status quo is always in the choice set.
Assumption 3 The fixed-installments plan is always in the choice set.
These assumptions might seem to be too restricting, however the model of focusing doesn’t
lose its explanatory power by assuming linear utility, since the model allows for any arbitrary
functional form of the focus function (see Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013). We assume that not
taking out a loan is always an option. Furthermore, since the fixed-installments plan is the
most typical loan, we assume that this repayment plan is always available in the choice-set.
Now, consider the following two consumption profiles: cA = (L,−x,−x, . . . ,−x) where
L, x ≥ 0 and c0 = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0). We can think of cA as a loan with fixed-installments (i.e.,
flat plan or annuity) and c0 as the loan-free status quo.5
Based on the aforementioned framework, a consumer is going to choose cA instead of
c0, whenever U(cA) ≥ U(c0), i.e when:
T∑
t=0
δtgtut(ct) ≥ 0 (1)
which, using assumption 1, results in
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ 0 (2)
Note, however, that consuming cA could lead to a negative consumption utility, while
(2) is satisfied. To illustrate that this may be the case, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxct ut(ct) − minct ut(ct), with cA and c0 as
follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
gt = maxct ut(ct)−minct ut(ct) 1000 600 600 600
5Notice that we do not restrict our analysis to the case of fair loans only. Throughout the paper a loan
is considered as a consumption profile, which can yield negative or non-negative utility to the consumer.
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In this case the consumer chooses cA, since U(cA) = 1000 · 1000 − 0.9 · 600 · 600 − 0.92 ·
600 · 600− 0.93 · 600 · 600 = 121960 > 0. However, cA yields a consumption-based utility of
U(cA) = 1000− 0.9 · 600− 0.92 · 600− 0.93 · 600 = −463.4 < 0. Hence, a consumer focusing
on the closer-to-the-present attributes may be tempted to choose a consumption profile which
yields a negative utility for her.
Assumption 4 All installments are strictly smaller than the lump-sum value, i.e., xi < L
for i = 1, . . . , T .
The implication of assumption 4 is that the loan is repaid in several installments.
Definition 1 For a given repayment plan the fair lump-sum value (LW ) is the value for
which the consumption utility is zero, i.e., LW +
∑T
t=1 δ
tut(ct) = 0.
Definition 2 For a given repayment plan the fair focus-weighted utility lump-sum value
(LFWU ) is the value for which the focus-weighted utility of the loan is zero, i.e., LFWU +∑T
t=1 δ
tgtut(ct) = 0.
Remark 1 Notice that for a given repayment plan, the decision-maker is willing to accept
a lower lump-sum value based on his focus-weighted utility than based on his consumption
utility, since LFWU < LW .
Thus, it is always possible to create a loan contract which seems to be positive for the
decision-maker even though it yields negative utility for her.
Definition 3 For a given repayment the focusing bias in loan decisions (B) is the difference
between the fair lump-sum values, i.e., B = LW − LFWU
Now, let us introduce one more consumption profile: cB = (L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ),
where xi ≤ xj whenever i ≥ j and xi ≥ 0, (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , T ). We assume that
∑T
t=1 δ
txt =∑T
t=1 δ
tx, where x refers to the installments of cA. One can think of cB as a decreasing loan
repayment plan with a present value equal as cA. In this case, the consumer’s maximization
problem can be written as:
max
ci
U(ci) for ci ∈ {c0, cA, cB}. (3)
Proposition 1 Introducing a decreasing loan repayment plan to a flat repayment plan de-
creases the focus-weighted utility of the flat plan.
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Proof: First, let us define k ≡ min{i|xi ≤ x}. If x1 ≥ x and xT ≤ x, then k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
is well defined, as it is the case for loan repayment plans. We need:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x−
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x
−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ −
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x
which is equivalent to
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(xt)− g(x)]x ≥ 0 (4)
Since g(·) is a positive, strictly increasing function and δ > 0, this inequality holds if
x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, which is the case by definition. 
Remark 2 Note that Proposition 1 also holds when any other type of loan repayment plan is
introduced. In this case we have to order the installments based on the difference between the
two plans, starting with the installments where the alternative repayment plan’s installments
is the highest. In this case, we get back to the same equations.
The consumer chooses cA if U(cA) ≥ max{0, U(cB)}, or cB whenever U(cB) ≥
max{0, U(cA)}. Otherwise, the optimal choice is c0. This yields an interesting result.
If the consumer’s profile set consists only of cA and c0, she chooses cA, whenever (2) is
satisfied. Yet, if cB is part of the set as well, she may prefer c0.
To demonstrate this, consider the next example.
Example 2 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxct ut(ct) − minct ut(ct) again and the con-
sumption profiles as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
cB 1000 -780 -670 -300
gt = maxct ut(ct)−minct ut(ct) 1000 780 670 600
In this case U(cA) = 1000 ·1000−0.9 ·780 ·600−0.92 ·670 ·600−0.93 ·600 ·600 = −9260 < 0,
U(c0) = 0 and U(cB) = 1000·1000−0.9·780·780−0.92·670·670−0.93·600·300 = −42389 < 0.
Therefore the optimal choice is c0.
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Formally:
Proposition 2 If C = {c0, cA, cB}, then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan
are both available to a consumer with a focus-weighted utility, then the former is always
preferred.
Proof: We shall prove that:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x+
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)xt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)xt (5)
Define yi ≡ xi − x. Note that yi ≥ 0 if i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and yi ≤ 0 otherwise. Thus
(5) can be written as:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)x+
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)(x+ yt) +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)(x+ yt)
This simplifies to:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)yt (6)
or
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt + g(x)
T∑
t=k
δtyt (7)
Since
∑T
t=1 δ
tx =
∑T
t=1 δ
t(x + yt), we have that
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0. Using this, (7) can be
written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt − g(x)
k−1∑
t=1
δtyt
that is
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(x+ yt)− g(x)]yt (8)
As yt > 0 for t = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and g(·) is strictly positive and increasing, this inequality
always holds. Moreover, the inequality is strict whenever ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1} for which
yi > 0, in other words when cA 6= cB. 
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Remark 3 Proposition 2 holds even if cB is not a decreasing but any other type of loan
repayment plan. In this case, inequality (7) can be rewritten as 0 ≤ ∑t∈K δtg(x + yt)yt +
g(x)
∑
t/∈K δ
tyt, where K is the set of indices for which the non-flat installment is higher
than the respective repayment of the flat schedule.
Proposition 3 Introducing any type of repayment plan in addition to a fixed-installments
plan decreases the bias B.
Proof: According to Proposition 1 introducing an alternative repayment plan with the same
present-value as the flat plan makes the fixed-installment plan less attractive. Thus LFWU
increases compared to the original settings. However, we also know from Proposition 2 that
the fixed-installments plan is preferred to the other repayment plan. Thus by introducing a
new repayment plan LFWU is increasing while LW doesn’t change. As a consequence, the
bias B decreases. 
Proposition 4 Introducing any number of repayment plans in addition to a fixed-install-
ments plan decreases the bias B.
Proof: We have seen in Proposition 3 that introducing any new repayment plan would
increase LFWU . Now, consider the case where there are several new repayment plans
additional to the original fixed-installments plan. Take one of the new repayment plans
and for the sake of simplicity label it as the second repayment plan. Based on Proposition
2 we know that the second repayment plan is dominated by the fixed-installments plan
when only two of them are in the choice-set with the loan-free status quo. There are two
possibilities in this case. One, the decision-maker still chooses the fixed-installments plan,
in which case we know that LFWU has increased because of the new repayment plan from
previous propositions. Second, the decision-maker chooses the second repayment plan,
in which case, the LFWU of the repayment plan is higher than the LFWU of the fixed-
installments plan when there are only two repayment plans available. We also know that
this LFWU is greater than the LFWU when only the fixed-installments plan is available.
Thus, the LFWU of the second repayment plan is greater than the LFWU of the fixed-
installments plan in the original setting. Since we have chosen the second repayment plan
arbitrarily from the new repayment plans, it is true for all of them. As a consequence, the
bias B decreases. 
3 Focus weights based on discounted values
So far, we considered cases using focus weights based on nominal values of the repay-
ment plans. Let us now examine our results when the focusing is based on discounted
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values, that is when gt ≡ g(δt(maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct))). In the following we will show
that if we define focus weights in terms of discounted values Proposition 1 to 4 still hold
for decreasing-installment plans, although not necessarily for other installments such as
increasing-installment plans.
Proposition 5 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values, introducing a
decreasing loan repayment schedule makes a flat plan less attractive for the consumer.
Proof: In this case (4) changes to:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtxt)x−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtx)x ≥ 0 (9)
Since x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, g(·) positive and strictly increasing, while δ ∈ (0, 1] this inequality
always holds. 
Remark 4 Note that Proposition 5 is true whenever any type of loan repayment schedule
is introduced instead of a decreasing one. In order to show this we have to re-index the
installments based on the differences between the two plans, starting with the installment
when the alternative repayment plan’s installment is the highest compared to the flat plan’s
installment.
Proposition 6 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values and C =
{c0, cA, cB} then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan are both available to a
consumer, then the former is always preferred.
Proof: In this case (6) can be written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt (10)
Notice that
∑T−1
t=k δ
tg(δtx)yt is negative, since yt < 0 for any t = k, . . . , T . That is, by
replacing δt with δk for each t = k, . . . , T , we have that the right-hand side of (10) is never
lower than
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt. Hence:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt ≥
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt (11)
=
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
∑T
t=k δ
tyt (12)
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Since
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0, we have that
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
k−1∑
t=1
−δtyt =
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt −
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δkx)yt (13)
which can be written as
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(δt(x+ yt))− g(δkx)]yt (14)
As y1, . . . , yk−1 ≥ 0 and g(·) is positive and strictly increasing, this latter expression is
always non-negative, that is (10) always holds. 
Proposition 6 is not necessarily true if cB is not a decreasing repayment plan, but for
instance, an increasing plan. To demonstrate this consider the following example.
Example 3 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9, gt = δt[maxct ut(ct) −minct ut(ct)] and the consumption
profiles be as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
ci 1000 -542 -602 -669
maxct ut(ct)−minct ut(ct)] 1000 600 602 669
gt 1000 540 487.62 487.7
In this case U(cA) = 1000·1000−0.9·540·600−0.92·487.62·600−0.93·487.7·600 = 258096.26,
U(c0) = 0 and U(ci) = 1000 · 1000− 0.9 · 540 · 542− 0.92 · 487.62 · 602− 0.93 · 487.7 · 669 =
260962.47. Therefore the optimal choice is ci.
Thus the welfare effect of introducing any repayment plan is ambiguous. However, introduc-
ing a decreasing repayment plan still provides welfare improvement which could be shown
with the same arguments as we used in the case of nominal values.
Remark 5 Notice that for the propositions to hold we don’t need a real decreasing-install-
ments plan in the sense that xi ≥ xj whenever i ≥ j, we only need a repayment plan with
a k for which xi > x if i < k and xi ≤ x, otherwise.
4 Discussion
Our propositions in both specifications suggest that introducing a new repayment plan
increases the LFWU of a flat plan. One might argue that this may possibly deter the
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decision-maker from taking out a loan which could result in positive consumption utility.
This, however, cannot be the case. Whenever the consumption utility of a loan is positive
the focus-weighted utility of it is positive as well.
Remark 6 If U(c) > 0, then U(c) > 0 also holds. To show this consider the following.
The focus-weighted utility of c = (L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ) can be written as g0L − δg1x1 −
δ2g2x2−· · ·−gT δTxT , where gt is the focus weight for period t. Since xi < L (i = 1, . . . , T ),
we have that g0 ≥ gt for any t = 1, . . . , T . Thus g0L − δg1x1 − δ2g2x2 − · · · − gT δTxT ≥
g0L − δg0x1 − δ2g0x2 − · · · − g0δTxT = g0(L −
∑T
t=1 δ
txt). This is always positive, since
U(c) > 0 and g0 > 0.
Proposition 7 Our results remain valid in the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laib-
son, 1997).
Proof: Using βδ(t) instead of δ(t) the relevant expressions increase β-fold, where β ∈ (0, 1]
is the parameter for present bias. By dividing them with β > 0 we obtain exactly the same
inequalities we derived in the above proofs. 
Independently from the specification of the focusing function, our results suggest that
introducing a decreasing repayment plan decreases the focusing bias. In other words, a loan
is always less attractive based on its focus-weighted utility compared to its consumption
utility when a new decreasing plan is introduced and as a consequence the bias B =
LW − LFWU decreases. We have also shown that the decrease of the bias caused by the
introduction of new repayment plan cannot deter the decision-maker from taking out a loan
with positive consumption utility. Moreover, introducing quasi-hyperbolic discounting for
modeling present biased behavior does not affect our results.
It is important, however, to investigate which of the specifications is more descriptive
for loan decisions. The main testable difference in implications is the attitude towards
increasing repayment plans. This is especially relevant nowadays because of the various
new types of mortgages. Interest-only mortgages and deferred amortization mortgages
could all be examples of different types of increasing repayment plans. These financial
innovations, however, have unclear impact on loan decisions and one might think that they
have a negative effect on the decision-maker’s judgment. According to some experimental
and empirical findings increasing repayment plans are less preferred than other types of
repayment plans which suggests that the specification of focusing on nominal values might
be more descriptive for loan decisions. For example, empirical findings by Hoelzl et al.
(2011) suggest that subjects prefer fixed-installment plans over increasing-installment plans
and this preference is robust both in presence and in absence of interest rate. On the other
hand, the popularity of alternative mortgages (see Mayer et al., 2009) indicate that the
model with focusing on discounted values might be more robust than the one with nominal
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values.6 Furthermore, one may reason that the higher default rate observed among those
who choose increasing-installment plans (Amromin et al., 2011) might be due to its stronger
focusing bias. This again supports the specification with focusing on discounted values.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the effects of focusing in the presence of discounting
and provided two specifications. In the first case we defined the focus weights based on
nominal values of the attributes, while in the second case we defined the focus weights on
discounted values. In the first specification we have shown that any extension of the choice
set might improve consumer welfare. However, in the second specification, it is possible
that an extension of the choice set with an increasing-installments plan leads welfare loss.
Based on the results we conjecture that adding a decreasing installment plan to the
choice set would make the decision-maker less likely to take out loans which yield them
negative utility. Furthermore, we propose that people would prefer the fixed-installments
plan from this choice set. However, further empirical studies are needed to test these results.
We argue that by exploiting the aforementioned effect of focus, people could make
more deliberate loan decisions. If banks for example would present a loan in fixed- and
decreasing-installments options, they could end up getting more prudent decisions from
their clients. This obviously boils down to policy making. Namely, a policy could prescribe
that financial institutions present a loan repayment schedule also in a decreasing-installment
option, and not only in fixed- or increasing-installment one. The induced focus on the
decreasing-installments plan could dampen the increased focus on getting the loan, thereby
discouraging the decision-maker from taking out a loan which might yield her a negative
utility. This might be especially important in the case of loans with increasing-intallments
plans (e.g. mortgages with initial ’teaser’ rates), since these instruments could generate the
highest focusing bias, and as a consequence, might motivate harmful loan consumption the
most.
6However, van Leeuwn and Bokeloh (2012) argue that the popularity of some specific increasing repay-
ment plans (i.e., interest-only mortgages and deferred amortization mortgages) in different countries might
be only due to tax refund possibilities. This is supported by the empirical findings of Cox et al. (2014), who
claim that in the Netherlands the increasing repayment plans were taken out by wealthier, less risk averse
and more financially literate people suggesting that these loans are not preferred due to misperception, but
for some other reasons.
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